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I. INTRODUCTION
The Dominion Post headline asked, "Can Morgantown support 41
movie screens?"' Quadrupling the number of movie screens in Morgantown
may provide moviegoers with more options; however, the business viability of
these theaters is questionable. In any industry, each new entrant increases the
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risk of market saturation . While market saturation among competitors may be
expected, owners taking from their own businesses' market share is not.4 This
is essentially the result forced upon franchisees when their franchisors encroach
upon them. In franchising, encroachment occurs when a franchisor continues
granting or opening new franchises within a particular geographic area to the
point of taking sales from an existing franchise. 5 Consider the situation of Laur-
ence Geller, the owner of the California Ritz-Carlton Laguna Niguel, operated
by Marriott International.6 After Mr. Geller complained about various Marriott
practices, Marriott, who also owns the Ritz name, responded with a Ritz clone
three miles up the coast. While this meant certain lost bookings for Geller's
Ritz, Marriott, which makes its money mostly from fee income, would only
benefit.8 In fact, "[m]anaging two hotels on a prime stretch of Pacific coastline
would increase Marriott's bottom line even if neither property made money for
the owners. That's the beauty of being a hotel franchisor or operator, which
Marriott is, rather than an owner of hotel buildings, which Geller is." 9 Hotel
management companies, such as Marriott, enter into operating agreements with
hotel owners, who use the management company trade name and operating
standards to operate the hotel.'0 The management companies then have access
to sensitive, competitive information that may enable them to act to the detri-
ment of, or even compete against, the hotel owner."
Geller and others in similar positions have argued that Marriott has a
"fiduciary duty" to them, which would require Marriott to act in the best interest
of its owners.12 The hotel industry is unique in its intertwined nature of fran-
chise and management relationships; however, courts have frequently rejected
the existence of a fiduciary relationship between franchisors and franchisees,
3 Market saturation occurs when a product has been so widely distributed within a market that
competitors can only achieve sales growth through population growth or taking market share at
the expense of a competitor. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, Market Saturation,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Marketsaturation (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
4 Market share is the proportion of industry sales of a good or service that is controlled by a
company. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1072 (4th ed.
2000).
5 Jefferson I. Rust, Note, Regulating Franchise Encroachment: An Analysis of Current and
Proposed Legislative Solutions, 19 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 489, 490 (1994).




10 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, Partner, Katten Muchin, Zavis, Rosenman LLP (Jan.
5, 2005).
11 Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., ITT, 139 F.3d 1396, 1402
(11 th Cir. 1998).
12 Fitch, supra note 6, at 72.
[Vol. 108
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss2/11
MARKET IMPACT IN THE INFORMATION AGE
including in the encroachment context.13 In the hotel industry though, en-
croachment does not take place only within a single, geographic market. With
large convention or resort hotels, encroachment, or "impact" as it is known in
the industry, can take place on a national or even an international scale. Addi-
tionally, with management companies' access to hotels' billing rates, guest lists,
reservation systems, and other proprietary information, the potential for abuse is
staggering. As technologies which facilitate this abuse continue to progress,
courts and legislatures must act to prevent hotel management companies from
capitalizing on the conflicts of interest inherent in their relationships with hotel
owners.
This Note seeks to briefly examine the history of the franchise relation-
ship in the encroachment context, the nature and operation of hotel management
agreements, and the need for a quasi-fiduciary duty between hotel brand man-
agement companies and hotel owners. Part II discusses generally the nature of
the relationship, the problem of encroachment, and the various ways courts have
protected franchisees. Part Ill looks at the hotel industry, both from a franchis-
ing and an operating agreement perspective. It then explores the inherent prob-
lems of the operating agreement system in greater depth. Part IV argues for the
need for greater protection of hotel owners from abusive hotel management
companies. Courts and legislatures should impose duties on management com-
panies toward their hotel owners to disclose risks, protect the owners' invest-
ments, and not engage in self-dealing detrimental to hotel owners through the
use of the owners' proprietary information. Part V summarizes the key points
and arguments of the Note.
HI. THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP AND REGULATION
A. The Franchise Relationship and the Encroachment Problem
I. The Franchise Relationship
A franchise relationship is created when a franchisor, who owns a
trademark or trade name, grants a franchisee the right to engage in the business
of the franchisor, using the particular trademark in a certain area.14 The business
may be selling goods or providing services.' 5 The Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.) describes a franchise as a "continuing commercial relationship ...
whereby" the franchisee sells goods or services which "are identified by a trade-
mark [or] trade name," where the franchisee is "required or advised to meet
quality standards prescribed by" the franchisor, who "has authority to exert a
significant degree of control over the franchisee's method of operation, includ-
13 See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 347-48 (4th Cir.
1998); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 485 (5th Cir. 1984).
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ing but not limited to the franchisee's... management [and] marketing plan."'16
This seemingly convoluted description of franchising is actually quite telling.
First, the C.F.R. envisions a continuing relationship where the franchisee gets to
use the trade name for a certain period of time. Franchise agreements, the con-
tracts which create the franchise relationship and establish the terms and condi-
tions, typically provide for a ten to twenty year business relationship. 17 Second,
the franchisor is able to exert a significant amount of control over the franchi-
see, requiring him or her to conform to established standards for quality, mar-
keting, and other franchise norms.
The federal trademark law, the Lanham Act,' 8 requires licensors (fran-
chisors) to exercise quality control over the licensee (franchisee) or risk the loss
of the trademark. 19 Protecting the quality of the brand is not just required, but
mutually beneficial to the parties. For this reason, franchising has been de-
scribed as "the perfect marriage between big business and the small business-
man: the franchisor obtains new sources of expansion capital, new distribution
markets, and self-motivated vendors of its products, while the franchisee ac-
quires the products, expertise, stability, and marketing savvy usually reserved
only for larger enterprises."20 Therefore, these standards ensure that each fran-
chisee keeps the brand strong on a local level, so that the aggregate reputation of
the brand remains strong and goodwill continues to grow. 2' In turn, the franchi-
sor uses its superior marketing resources to promote this strong brand, bringing
customers to the local franchises to obtain the advertised brand's good or ser-
vice. This mutually beneficial "perfect marriage" works well, until the interests
of the parties begin to diverge.22
2. The Encroachment Problem
Franchisors typically want to continue market expansion to enhance
brand recognition, yet at some point this market expansion has a negative im-
pact on the sales of an existing franchise.23 The market becomes saturated with
the franchise's product and existing franchises begin to lose sales to other fran-
chises of the same type. Because there are more of the franchises, the franchisor
16 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (2005).
17 Rust, supra note 5, at 527.
IS Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2000).
19 Harold Brown, Franchising -A Fiduciary Relationship, 49 TEx. L. REv. 650, 662 (1971).
20 Rust, supra note 5, at 492 (quoting David J. Kaufmann, Business Strategies and Compliance
Issues, FRANCHSING 1990, at 15, 17 (1990)).
21 Subway restaurant chain, which was recently named the number one franchise opportunity
in Entrepreneur magazine's 2005 Franchise 500 listing, is an example of a traditional fast food
franchise. Entrepreneur.com, Entrepreneur's 26th Annual Franchise 500, http://www.entrepreneur
.com/franchise500 (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
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continues to achieve the desired goal of enhanced brand recognition. Most im-
portantly, because franchisors often make a large percentage of their royalties
from a percentage of sales, rather than profits,24 this creates a direct conflict of
interest between franchisors and their franchisees. Franchisors want to continue
expansion as long as total sales among franchisees are increasing, or even re-
maining constant, although the sales of each individual franchisee may be de-
creasing.25 This conflict of interest is the essence of the encroachment problem.
The common defense of the franchisors is freedom to contract.26 Franchise
agreements can contain territorial provisions which indicate whether the fran-
chisee has been granted an exclusive territory or not.27 Where the franchisee has
not been granted an exclusive territory, franchisors feel that it is their contract
right to expand into that market.28
B. Fiduciary Duty, Agency, and the Franchise Relationship
1. Fiduciary Duty and Franchises
A fiduciary relationship arises when one party, the fiduciary, is under a
duty to act for the benefit of another party, the beneficiary.29 A fiduciary duty is
"a duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor ... a duty to act with
the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best
interests of the other person. ' '30 Some examples of fiduciary relationships are
trustee-beneficiary, guardian-ward, principal-agent, and attorney-client, and
these relationships require "an unusually high degree of care., 31 The Restate-
ment of Agency states that "an agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters
within the scope of his agency, ' '32 meaning the principal is the beneficiary of the
relationship. Among the specific duties of an agent to the principal are the du-
ties to act "solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with
24 Id. See also Fitch, supra note 6.
25 Rust, supra note 5, at 490.
26 Id. at 490-91. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 8, Unenforceabil-
ity on Grounds of Public Policy, Introductory Note (1981) ("The principle of freedom of contract
is itself rooted in the notion that it is in the public interest to recognize that individuals have broad
powers to order their own affairs by making legally enforceable promises.").
27 An exclusive territory is "a geographical area specifically designated as the exclusive terri-
tory" of a particular franchisee. Rust, supra note 5, at 510. Within the exclusive territory, fran-
chisors are prohibited from establishing any new franchises or similar businesses. Id.
28 See, e.g., Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159, 1160 (I11. App. Ct. 1986);
Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
29 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004).
30 Id. at 545.
31 Id. at 1315.
32 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1958).
20051
5
Hale: Market Impact in the Information Age: Protecting Hotel Owners fro
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
the agency [and to] not act secretly in the same transaction on the agent's own
account or act for an adverse party without the principal's consent.
33
Franchisees have long tried to argue that, because of the mutually de-
pendant nature of the relationship, franchises should constitute a fiduciary rela-
tionship. 34 For example, in Arnott v. American Oil Co., which concerned a ma-
jor oil company franchisor and a service station dealer franchisee, the court
found that because both parties have a common interest in the profitability and
goodwill of the venture, a fiduciary duty is inherent in a franchise relationship
as a matter of law. 35 However, Arnott was a wrongful termination case, and
except in that context, courts have nearly universally found that there is no gen-
eral fiduciary relationship in the franchise setting, even in the encroachment
context.
36
In Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc.,37 the franchise
agreement stated that it was not an exclusive license, that is, there was no terri-
torial protection for the franchisee, and that Holiday Inns, the franchisor, "may
construct and operate one or more Holiday Inns at any place other than on the
site licensed [to franchisee]." Then, when Holiday Inns purchased a competing
hotel and converted it into a rival Holiday Inn, thus competing with the plaintiff-
franchisee, the franchisee alleged that this was a violation of the franchise
agreement. 38 The court found however, that there was no general fiduciary ob-
ligation imposed upon franchisors, and therefore no breach of that duty. 39 The
general argument against finding a fiduciary duty is the same argument against
inferring any territorial protection: potential impairment of the parties' freedom
to contract.40
2. The Agency Relationship and Franchises as Agencies
An agency is a fiduciary relationship that results when a principal gives
an agent permission to act on his behalf and subject to the principal's control,
and the agent agrees to act as such.4 1 A principal is liable for any torts an agentcommits while acting in the scope of their employment.42 Courts have typically
33 HARRY G. HENN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER UNINCORPORATED BuSINESS
ENTERPRISES 186 (2d ed. 1985).
34 See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, 155 F.3d 331, 347-48 (4th Cir. 1998);
Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1984).
35 609 F.2d 873, 881-82 (8th Cir. 1979).
36 See, e.g., Broussard, 155 F.3d at 348; Domed Stadium Hotel, 732 F.2d at 485.
37 Domed Stadium Hotel, 732 F.2d at 483.
38 Id. at 484.
39 Id. at 485.
40 Rust, supra note 5, at 491. See also Fitch, supra note 6.
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
42 See id. § 219.
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found franchises to not be agency relationships, unless the franchisor exerts too
much control over the franchisee.4 3 This creates a dilemma for franchisors, who
have to exert enough control to adequately protect their trademark under the
Lanham Act, yet not exert too much control so as to be found a principal, and
thus become liable for the torts of their franchisees. It is important to note that,
even if franchisors try to disclaim an agency relationship in the franchise
agreement, the courts may still find an agency relationship exists.
44
C. The Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
With no relief from the courts for franchisor encroachment under a fi-
duciary duty theory, franchisees have sought relief under a duty of good faith
and fair dealing. Courts commonly state that "in every contract there exists an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 45 This implied covenant has
been explained as meaning that neither party will act to injure the rights of the
other party to receive the fruits of the contract. 46 Particularly in contracts which
confer on one party a discretionary power affecting the rights of the other, "a
duty is imposed to exercise the discretion in good faith and in accordance with
fair dealing. '' 7 The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) defines good faith as
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing.' '4 However, most courts allow parties to elaborate the scope of the
duty, or to even effectively write the good faith requirement out of the con-
tract.49 In Domed Stadium Hotel, for example, the court found that because the
franchise agreement was not an exclusive agreement, and because it granted
Holiday Inns the right to operate other Holiday Inns, this was not a breach of the
implied obligation of good faith.50 With regard to the implied covenant of good
faith, the court stated, "[t]he implied obligation to execute a contract in good
faith usually modifies the express terms of the contract and should not be used
to override or contradict them.,
5 1
43 See, e.g., Hong Wu v. Dunkin' Donuts, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), ajTd,
4 F. App'x 82 (2d Cir. 2001); Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 219 S.E.2d 874, 877-78 (Va. 1975).
But see, e.g., Parker v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 629 So. 2d 1026, 1027, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1993); Font v. Stanley Steemer Int'l, Inc., 849 So. 2d 1214, 1216, 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
44 Brown, supra note 19, at 667. See also infra notes 97 and 98 and accompanying text.
45 Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 167 (N.Y. 1933); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
46 Kirke La Shele, 188 N.E. at 167.
47 Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 510 (Cal. 1985) (quoting Cal. Lettuce Growers
v. Union Sugar Co., 289 P.2d 785, 791 (Cal. 1955)).
48 U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2004).
49 See, e.g., Patel v. Dunkin' Donuts of Am., Inc., 496 N.E.2d 1159, 1160 (111. App. Ct. 1986);
Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958, 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
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Two years after Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc., in the Illinois case of Patel
v. Dunkin' Donuts of America, Inc., the franchisee brought suit alleging breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on another non-
exclusive franchise agreement when Dunkin' Donuts planned to construct a
competing franchise within one mile of plaintiffs existing franchise.52  The
franchise agreement in Patel, like the one in Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc., also
granted the franchisor the sole discretion to operate or franchise other Dunkin'
Donuts shops.53 The plaintiffs urged that they were not claiming entitlement to
territorial exclusivity, but rather that the defendants' conduct denied plaintiffs
the fruits of their franchise agreement, a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.54 The court found that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is generally implied in every contract, however, it can essen-
tially be written out by express terms.55 Therefore, here, where the contract
permitted defendants' "unrestricted competition," 56 the court found no breach of
the implied covenant of good faith, even where significant encroachment was
expected.57
After these rather narrow constructions of the implied covenant of good
faith, some courts showed their willingness to "back in" to an implied covenant
breach where the franchise agreement does not explicitly state the franchisor's
right to establish competing franchises.58 In Scheck v. Burger King Corp., for
example, the franchise agreement specifically stated that the franchisee had no
exclusive territorial protection, yet did not expressly state that Burger King
could establish other franchises at any desired location.59 Therefore, because the
agreement did not affirmatively grant Burger King the right to encroach upon
the franchisee, the court found an opportunity to apply the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing as a gap filler, to prevent Burger King from en-
croaching upon its franchisee.6° Although the Sheck opinion has been criticized
and distinguished, it has been followed where franchise agreements are silent as
to the rights of franchisors.
52 496 N.E.2d at 1159-60.
53 Id. at 1159.
54 Id. at 1160.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1161.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., ITT, 139 F.3d
1396, 1403-05 (11th Cir. 1998); Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 692, 693-94 (S.D.
Fla. 1992).
59 Scheck, 798 F. Supp. at 694.
60 Id.
61 See, e.g., Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, 139 F.3d at 1403 n.6; In re Vylene Enters., Inc., 90
F.3d 1472, 1477 (9th Cir. 1996).
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D. Other Means of Franchise Regulation
Besides judicially created remedies, states legislatures have also taken
steps to regulate the franchise relationship and prevent franchisor abuses.62
Many states have adopted industry-specific legislation to regulate franchise rela-
tionships, such as in the automobile industry.63 Several states have also enacted
franchise relationship laws to monitor the ongoing relationship between franchi-
sees and franchisors, primarily to prevent arbitrary termination, but also en-
croachment. 64 One of the most potent regulations affecting franchisors how-
ever, has been franchise disclosure laws.65 These laws6 require franchisors to
disclose detailed information to potential franchisees concerning practically
every aspect of the franchise system, including territorial restrictions to protect
against encroachment. 67 The most effective part of the disclosure laws are the
requirements that franchisors disclose information regarding the history of
criminal and civil litigation within the franchise system, alerting potential fran-
chisees that a franchise system has been plagued with complaints of abusive
68practices. The threat of disclosure to potential franchisees serves as a strong
deterrent to franchisors when considering whether to engage in questionable
practices toward its franchisees. 69
E. Summary of Franchise Regulation and Encroachment
Courts have recognized a fiduciary relationship for wrongful termina-
70tion of a franchise agreement, yet have most often relied on the implied cove-
62 Rust, supra note 5, at 503.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 509.
65 Id. at 506-08.
66 See David L. Cahn, Ten ways for a franchisor to get sued by its franchisees, THE DALY
REcoRD (Balt., MD) July 2, 2004.
Under regulations issued by the Federal Trade Commission, any person who offers a fran-
chise must provide the prospective franchisee with a disclosure document that contains cer-
tain types of information. Thirteen states, including Maryland, require that, before a franchi-
sor offers a franchise for sale in the state, a state administrator review the franchise disclo-
sure document. The administrator must find that the franchisor has provided the information
required under the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular Guidelines before authorizing the
sale of such franchises in the state.
Id.
67 Rust, supra note 5, at 506-08.
68 Id.
69 See Cahn, supra note 66. All states have now adopted the Uniform Franchise Offering
Circular (UFOC), but that these disclosure requirements are much more effective when applied in
conjunction with state laws that ensure proper compliance. Id. Thirteen states, including Mary-
land, have adopted these stricter state laws. Id.
70 Arnott v. Am. Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979).
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nants of good faith and fair dealing to protect franchisees in the encroachment
context.7' These cases have not been well received,72 and have required the
courts to use a "backing in" type analysis to achieve the desired result.7 This
gap-filler approach works when contracts are silent about exclusive territory
protection. Unfortunately, most franchise agreements do not leave many holes
for franchisees to attack, and courts have found that the covenant of good faith
may not be used to rewrite or override the express terms of a contract. 74 There
are now franchise regulations in many states, such as franchise disclosure laws,
that protect against many franchisor abuses."
11I. THE HOTEL FRANCHISE SYSTEM/OPERATION MANAGEMENT
ARRANGEMENT
The hotel franchise industry began with two distinct types of franchi-
sors. There were traditional franchisors, known as brand companies, and there
were management companies.76
A. Brand Companies
Brand companies' operations, for example, Howard Johnson and Holi-
day Inn, were very similar to traditional franchisors, such as fast food restau-
rants.77 The companies provided owners with the franchise name, trademarks,
etc. and established certain guidelines for hotel owners to follow in accordance
with the franchise system. 78 Owners were responsible for managing the hotel
themselves, in accordance to the franchise standards, like most franchisees.7 9
As with most franchises, these arrangements were found not to amount to a fi-
duciary relationship, or an agency relationship80 Therefore, these brand com-
panies have traditionally been subject to ordinary franchise regulation such as
disclosure laws. 81 Most encroachment issues are determined in the franchise
71 See, e.g., Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., IT', 139 F.3d
1396 (11 th Cir. 1998); Scheck v. Burger King Corp., 798 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
72 See, e.g., Payne v. McDonald's Corp., 957 F. Supp. 749 (D. Md. 1997).
73 See Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc., 139 F.3d 1396, Scheck, 798 F. Supp. 692 (relying on
silence of agreement as to franchisors' explicit right to create competing franchises within a cer-
tain proximity of franchisees).
74 See, e.g., Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass. 1980).
75 Rust, supra note 5, at 506-08.




80 See, e.g., Domed Stadium Hotels, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1984).
S1 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10.
[Vol. 108
10
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 108, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol108/iss2/11
MARKET IMPACT IN THE INFORMATION AGE
agreement, with the franchisee either being granted an exclusive territory or
not.82 As in the Scheck case, where the contract is silent as to the franchisor's
rights to encroach upon the franchisee, courts have sometimes inferred a duty of
good faith and fair dealing.83 However, the most effective deterrent against
abuse for these hotels have been the disclosure laws which require the hotels to
disclose any potential conflicts of interest, past claims of misconduct, or litiga-
tion to potential franchisees in the franchise offering circular.
84
B. Management Companies
Hotel management companies have a more complicated history than
brand companies. The management companies began by leasing the hotels from
the owners. 8' The hotels were largely owned by insurance companies, pension
funds and other institutional investors, and were disallowed by their industries'
regulators to participate in the risk of operating hotels.86 By leasing and operat-
ing the hotels for a rental fee, the management companies made money based on
the actual profitability of the hotel, and therefore bore the risk of loss. 87 That is,
the hotel company would lease the hotel, then operate it and be responsible for
whether the business survived, just as if they actually owned it. The actual hotel
owner received rental income and basically just owned the building. This meant
that management companies had no incentive to encroach on the hotels they
were operating, and had all the incentive to see that business flourished.88
Later, hotel owners' regulators began to relax some of the restrictions
against the companies' investments. 89 This allowed the hotel owners to begin
operating hotels as well as owning them. However, the hotel companies that
had been leasing the hotels still had all of the experience and expertise necessary
to run the hotels. Therefore, owners retained these same companies, except
under a different type of operating agreement. The hotel management compa-
nies stopped leasing the hotels.9° Instead, the management companies entered
agency management agreements, where the management agreements explicitly
stated that the management companies were the agents of the hotel owners.
91
82 Id.
83 See, e.g., Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., IT, 139 F.3d
1396 (11 th Cir. 1998).
84 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10. See also Rust, supra note 5, at 506-
08.






91 See, e.g., Woolley v. Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719, 725 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
("The sole relationship between Owner and [manager] is that of principal and agent.").
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The key difference was that instead of the management companies paying a
rental fee and then being responsible for the bottom line, the hotel owners paid
the management companies a management fee, often a percentage of revenues,
and then received the bottom line profit amount.
92
Management companies originally liked the agency management rela-
tionship because the companies were able to operate for this percentage of reve-
nues without bearing the risk of lOSS. 9 3 But, this shift of the risk of loss created
the conflict of interest between hotel owners and hotel management companies.
That is, because the management companies were now operating for a flat man-
agement fee, or a percentage of revenues, the situation was the same as for regu-
lar franchisors and franchisees: the management companies would want to
manage as many properties as possible, spreading the name and reputation of
their company as widely as possible, without regard for the bottom line profit-
ability of the hotel owners. However, owners still found some protection from
abuse because agents are fiduciaries of their principals.94 Then, because man-
agement companies were being held to the high standard required of fiduciaries,
the hotel companies no longer wanted to be agents of the hotel owners.95 The
companies began disclaiming any agency relationship.96 The companies would
enter the exact same operating agreement, but insert the language that no agency
relationship exists.97 However, the management companies' roles remained the
same and some courts found that an agency relationship remained, even in light
of the attempted disclaimer.98 This is because the Restatement of Agency sug-
gests that courts should look to the substance and performance of the agreement
rather than the express provisions." However, some courts do honor the no-
agency disclaimer, which leads to the counterintuitive result of management
92 For purposes of this discussion, revenues are a company's cash inflows from sales before
any expenses or taxes are taken out. Profits, or net income, are the revenues minus expenses and
taxes.
93 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10.
94 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1. See also supra text accompanying note 32.
95 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 See, e.g., Sklar v. Princess Properties, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1202, 1205-1206 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987), Franksen v. Crossroads Joint Venture, 515 N.W.2d 794, 801 (Neb. 1994) ("Whether an
agency exists depends on the facts underlying the relationship of the parties irrespective of the
words or terminology used by the parties to characterize or describe their relationship.").
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § I cmt. b (1958).
The relation which the law calls agency does not depend upon the intent of the parties to
create it, nor their belief that they have done so. To constitute the relation, there must be an
agreement ... between the parties; if the agreement results in the factual relation between
them to which are attached the legal consequences of agency, an agency exists although the
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agreements that are arguably fiduciary in nature (given that the relationship used
to be considered fiduciary and has changed in name only) receiving less protec-
tion from abuse than simple franchise agreements, with their disclosure laws,
that are decidedly not fiduciary. 
100
1. Hotel Management Agreements - Potential for Abuse
Aside from the inherent conflict of interest with hotel management
companies' fee structures and the inducement to encroach upon their owners,
there are numerous other potentials for abuse that hotel management companies
use to profit at the expense of their owners and to facilitate encroachment, or
impact. For example, there have been many cases where management compa-
nies would purchase supplies and then overcharge the hotel owners for reim-
bursement. 10' Courts have found this to amount to a "[management company]
put[ting] [its] interests ahead of [hotel owners'] interests, thereby violating the
Agency Provision of the Management Contract" where the management compa-
nies were improperly receiving kickbacks without disclosing them to hotel own-
ers, consistent with their role as an agent. 10 2 This is an example of self-dealing
that may be harder to remedy without an agency relationship between the par-
ties, because less disclosure is required when no agency relationship exists.
The most dangerous situation is the management companies' access to
private information about each hotel and the ability to manipulate technologies
such as chain-wide reservation systems to avert potential business from hotel
owners. For example, in 2660 Woodley Road v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 103 in addi-
tion to the management company receiving kickbacks on supply purchases, the
hotel owners, including the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company,
alleged that the management company was abusing the frequent travelers pro-
gram, failing to limit usable denials, 1°4 improperly profiting from providing
Workers' Compensation insurance, permitting excessive numbers of compli-
mentary rooms, and breaching other unspecified contractual duties. 10 5 In Camp
Creek Hospitality v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., plaintiffs argued that a competi-
tor was able to obtain "information concerning the Inn's occupancy levels, aver-
age daily rates, discounting policies, rate levels, long term contracts, marketing
plans, and operating expenses ...and that he may have used it to compete
100 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10.
101 See, e.g., 2660 Woodley Road v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 369 F.3d 732 (3rd Cir. 2004); In
Town Hotels, Inc. v. Marriott International, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.W.V. 2003).
102 2660 Woodley Road v. ITr Sheraton Corp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 439, 8 (D. Del. 2002).
103 2660 Woodley Road, 369 F.3d 732.
104 Id. at 736, n.1 ("According to Sheraton, a usable denial occurs when a potential guest is
denied a reservation when a room is actually available.").
1o5 Id. at 736.
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against the Inn."'' 6 Camp Creek also provided evidence that Sheraton Reserva-
tions agents systematically favored a competitor's hotel over the plaintiff's hotel
when fielding calls. 107 The abuses that Camp Creek asserted occurred before the
Internet and related technologies became prevalent. 10 8 This type of favoritism
and access to sensitive information is even easier with today's technology. For
example, brand managers can control the order in which hotels appear on their
website and reservation system and choose to favor one hotel over another. 10 9
Finally, what makes hotel "impact" different from typical franchise en-
croachment is the potential scope of the infringement. Recall that franchise
encroachment deals with a limited geographic area and the existence of exclu-
sive or non-exclusive territorial licenses. However, with hotels, the relevant
market can be a single city, for example a website that lists all of a given
brands' Atlanta hotels in a particular order, or national or even international. 11'
For example, a brand manager can use its national sales office to divert a large
group meeting from one major convention hotel to another one a thousand miles
away.' 2 This is especially abusive because some management companies, such
as Marriott, own some of the hotels that they manage, creating another direct
conflict of interest. 113 Now that management companies disclaim agency re-
sponsibilities, there are less disclosure requirements, and discovery of abuse is
much more difficult for hotel owners."
14
Moreover, when courts found an agency relationship existed between
owners and management companies, courts routinely held that hotel owners
were free to terminate the management agreement because a principal's powers
of revocation are absolute.' 15 Owners could possibly become subject to wrong-
ful termination contract damages, 1 6 but the owners would be able to get out of
the arrangement earlier, and management companies would have to be candid in
discovery in order to show that there was no wrongdoing. 1 7 This was a big
106 Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., r, 139 F.3d 1396, 1410
(1llth Cir. 1998).
107 Id. at 1406.
108 The abuses complained of occurred in 1992 and 1993.
109 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10.
110 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (2005).
II A search on Marriott's website for Atlanta hotels alone yielded 68 hotels under the various
Marriott brand names. Marriott, http://www.marriott.com (last visited Dec. 26, 2005).
112 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10.
113 Fitch, supra note 6 ("Hilton and Starwood each hold 30% of the full-service rooms under
their flags.").
114 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10.
115 See, e.g., Gov't Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 95 F.3d 291 (3rd Cir. 1996); Woolley v.
Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
116 Woolley, 278 Cal. Rptr. 719 at 725.
117 Online Interview with K.C. McDaniel, supra note 10.
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strength for hotel owners because the management companies do not want to
disclose everything to hotel owners." 8 However, now that some courts allow
management companies to disclaim any agency relationship, this right to termi-
nate becomes more doubtful, especially in light of a recent Maryland statute.
2. Maryland Statute
Title 23 of the Commercial Law section of the Maryland Code, which
relates to operating agreements for hotels, states that where the implied terms of
an agreement conflict with the express terms, the express terms will govern." 9
Therefore, even though the parties' conduct may imply an agency relationship,
which in the past been construed to create an agency with its attendant fiduciary
duty, the disclaimer of agency will indemnify the management company from
any fiduciary obligations.120  Additionally, the statute provides that the man-
agement agreement cannot be terminated before the expiration of the operating
agreement, unless the operating agreement contains a right of early termina-
tion.' 21 Of course, this also directly contradicts the established agency rule of
the principal's absolute right to termination. 122 Finally, the statute effectively
"allows courts to order the specific performance of management agreements,
notwithstanding that this forces an owner to grant fiduciary powers and accept
an imposed agency relationship."'
2 3
Now, hotel management companies can impose a personal services con-
tract on hotel owners through the courts, 2 4 although there are several important
arguments against requiring specific performance of personal services con-
tracts. 25 Among the most important reasons against requiring specific perform-
ance of a personal services contract, in this context particularly, are the "friction
and social costs which result when the parties are reunited in a relationship that
has already failed, especially where the services involve mutual confidence and
the exercise of discretionary authority."'' 26 Yet, this law may require hotel own-
118 Id.
119 MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW II § 23-102 (2004).
120 Katten, Muchin, Zavis, Rosenman, Client Advisory, New Maryland Statute to Affect Agency




121 MD. CODE ANN., COMMERCIAL LAW II § 23-104 (2004).
122 See, e.g., Gov't Guarantee Fund v. Hyatt Corp., 95 F.3d 291 (3r Cir. 1996); Woolley v.
Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
123 Client Advisory, supra note 120.
124 Id.
125 See Woolley v. Embassy Suites, Inc., 278 Cal. Rptr. 719, at 727 (listing several reasons why
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ers to remain in a relationship with a disenchanted management company, who
is responsible for protecting the owner's investment in the hotel, with no real
duty to protect that investment. It is interesting to note that both Marriott
(which is headquartered in Maryland) 127 and Starwood Hotels (which is incorpo-
rated under Maryland law) submitted written statements in favor of the stat-
ute. 1
28
3. Summary of Hotel Management Company Regulation
Hotel management companies' fee structure of receiving a percentage
of revenues rather than a percentage of profit creates an inherent conflict of in-
terest. Specifically, the hotel management companies that are responsible for
hotel owners' investments have incentive to make more money at the expense of
the hotel owners. The potential for abuse in this arrangement is further facili-
tated by technologies which allow management companies access to hotel own-
ers' proprietary information and the ability to exploit it for the benefit of the
management company and at the expense of the hotel owner. Finally, this tech-
nology and the nature of the industry allow these management companies to
abuse hotel owners on a national, or even international, level. While hotel own-
ers have tried various ways to protect their investment, management companies
have continued to erode that protection to the point that a Maryland statute
forces hotel owners to remain in long-term contracts with potentially abusive
management companies who owe no duty to protect an owner's investment.
IV. ANALYSIS
Franchise encroachment began as a very local problem. Franchisees
were simple businessmen trying to operate their business and earn their liveli-
hood without their corporate giant franchisor placing a direct competitor across
the street from them. The problem was at least visible however. Franchisees
could see when they were losing business to a new pair of golden arches half a
mile down the road. With hotel impact, the problem is neither local nor visible.
Rather, the problem of hotel impact is one of global significance. Management
companies may persuade an organization to hold its convention in London or
Tokyo, for example, rather than in San Francisco or New York. Additionally,
unlike seeing customers in the drive-thru, hotel owners do not see potential cus-
tomers accessing the hotel website and choosing a more favorably advertised
alternative. The potential scope of this problem and the uncertainty surrounding
it create an unfair situation. A hotel owner can have business, if not directly
taken from them, at least diverted elsewhere, without ever knowing it, all by a
management company that should be looking out for the owner's interests. Ho-
127 See Fitch, supra note 6.
128 Client Advisory, supra note 120.
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tel management companies are entrusted with an owner's investment and some
duty of care should be required of them. Consider the scrutiny of corporate
CEOs responsible for shareholder investments. If not a general fiduciary duty,
management companies should at least be required to make certain disclosures
to potential investors and refrain from self-dealing.
Just as the Maryland legislature has responded to this problem, other
legislatures should respond, except to protect hotel owners. While the Maryland
law accommodates abusive hotel management companies, other legislatures
should insist on fair business practices. Just as franchise regulators enacted dis-
closure laws and other measures to control greedy, over-reaching franchisors,
legislatures should require similar controls for the large, secretive hotel man-
agement companies. Because, while no longer dealing with the stereotypical
unsophisticated franchisee running the corner filling station, we are also no
longer dealing with shady hotel management companies making a few extra
bucks on hotel towels. The abuses in the Camp Creek Hospitality case of steal-
ing customer lists, rate specials, etc. were problems from the early 1990s.
1 29
Today, we are in an era where grocery stores print customized coupons for the
next stop based on your purchases from the current or past visits.1 30 Marketing
experts track every imaginable trait of consumers and use them to their firm's
advantage. In a national or international market, the scope of the potential
abuses exhibited in Camp Creek and other similar cases have expanded expo-
nentially. It is a given that large conventions can only go to one hotel at a time,
however, where it can be shown that a hotel management company deliberately
diverts business to a particular location at the exclusion of another because of
self interests, this should constitute a breach of a duty. However, the self-
dealing will not always be as egregious, or as obvious, as a management com-
pany sending business to a hotel that the management company owns. The
business may be diverted to another owner's hotel, yet be more profitable for
the management company. Because this type of self-dealing is more subtle, and
thus more difficult to discover, it is important to impose disclosure duties on
management companies to deter these abusive practices. This is a 2 1st century
problem where the need for protection of hotel owners is greater than ever. This
is not a time to continue to erode that protection.
Franchisors often argued against the need to protect franchisees from
encroachment because of the freedom to contract and the benefit of the bar-
gain.' 3' However, this is not merely burying a term, or failing to include one, in
129 Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., ITT, 139 F.3d 1396, 1410
(11 th Cir. 1998).
130 See, e.g., Rod Hawkes, Back to the Future? Customer Relationship Marketing (CRM) in
Food Retailing, SMART MARKETING, July 2002, available at http://hortmgt.aem.comell.
edu/pdf/smart marketing/hawkes7-02.PDF.
131 See Rust, supra note 5, at 490-91, and accompanying text. See also RESTATEMENT
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a form contract. Rather, relying on management companies to protect an
owner's investment is more like blind faith. Without more adequate disclosure
and assurances from hotel management companies, owners have no idea what
management companies are doing with their proprietary information, what it is
costing them, or how it is benefiting the management companies. 32 Also, with-
out disclosure, owners don't even know where to look, or how to find evidence
of abuse, making actual damages very hard to prove. Then, if owners do sus-
pect abuse, there are rules, such as the Maryland law that require these owners
to stay in these long term contracts. For example, when Mr. Geller's problem
arose, he had sixteen years at four million dollars a year remaining on his con-
tract with Marriott.133 This is a ludicrous result: an owner who is possibly being
taken advantage of is forced to remain in a long term contract with the abusive
party. This Maryland law basically amounts to legislative acquiescence of hotel
management company abuse. A sixty-four million dollar problem for a hotel
owner that is possibly being abused, like Mr. Geller, is one that needs to be ad-
dressed.
Specifically, courts and legislatures should require hotel management
companies to disclose operating and financial details to hotel owners similar to
franchise disclosure laws.1 34 Because actual damages can be so difficult to
prove with such an expansive, secretive, technology-encrypted system, regula-
tors must require information and impose any affirmative duties on the front end
of the agreement. Hotel management companies should have to report any
complaints, pending, or past litigation to potential hotel owners. If not in Mary-
land, when given the chance, courts should absolutely find that an agency rela-
tionship exists, at least with respect to the narrow issue of the confidential in-
formation. There should be a quasi-fiduciary relationship, constructive trust, or
similar duty imposed on hotel management companies to not self-deal, using the
sensitive information arising from the confidential relationship with hotel own-
ers, at the expense of hotel owners. Finally, management companies found to
violate this duty, or not adequately disclose information to hotel owners, should
be subject to termination of the management contract and compensatory and
punitive damages.
In sum, the problem of hotel impact is one of international scope,
largely facilitated by sophisticated technology and access to proprietary infor-
mation. However, this technology not only enables hotel management compa-
nies to take advantage of their owners, but also aids them in keeping it secret.
Without the benefit of tangible evidence to point to, hotel owners are unlikely to
know when they are being taken advantage of by hotel management companies.
Additionally, when hotel owners suspect that they have been taken advantage of
132 See, e.g., Camp Creek Hospitality Inns, Inc. v. Sheraton Franchise Corp., ITT, 139 F.3d
1396 (1 1th Cir. 1998).
133 Fitch, supra note 6, at 68.
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by management companies, they will be unable to prove so. Therefore, it is
very important to impose affirmative duties on hotel management companies to
be honest and forthcoming from the outset. The information about past abuses
and complaints that franchise disclosure laws would require for example, would
caution potential owners of problems to be wary of, and make them think twice
before entering a relationship where they would be dependant upon the fairness
of a notoriously abusive management company. 35 More importantly, these
required disclosures would serve as a strong deterrent to management compa-
nies when considering engaging in potentially abusive practices. Providing for
stiff penalties and termination upon any breaches of a management companies'
duties to a hotel owner would then also serve both punitive and deterrent pur-
poses. Then, having to report the most recent breach or termination to the next
potential hotel owner through disclosure laws should begin a perpetual cycle
toward a fairer, more transparent relationship between hotel management com-
panies and hotel owners.
V. CONCLUSION
When franchising began, the concept of encroachment was a local geo-
graphic infringement problem. However, with today's technology, hotel man-
agement companies are able to infringe on their hotel owners on a much wider
scale. Also, just as the judicial protection against encroachment from franchi-
sors to franchisees has decreased over the years, so too has the protection af-
forded hotel owners from their management companies. But, most franchisees
now at least have the protection of disclosure laws which require franchisors to
disclose most potential abuses before entering the relationship. Meanwhile, as
technology expands, court protection decreases, and pro-management company
statutes are passed, the information gap between management company and
owner continues to broaden. Courts and legislatures must step in and re-assert
the importance of, and strengthen, the duty that management companies owe
hotel owners before the impact of these abuses make hotel ownership an un-
bearable risk.
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135 Rust, supra note 5, at 528.
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